

FIXED INCOME CLEARING CORPORATION

AND

NATIONAL SECURITIES CLEARING CORPORATION

PUBLIC QUANTITATIVE DISCLOSURES FOR CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES

Q1 2024

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PRINCIPLE #	DISCLOSURE #	DISCLOSURE TITLE
4	4.1	Total value of default resources (excluding initial and retained variation margin), split by clearing service if default funds are segregated by clearing service)
	4.2	Ксср
	4.3	Value of pre-funded default resources (excluding initial and retained variation margin) held for each clearing service, in total and split by
	4.4	Credit Risk Disclosures
5	5.1	Assets eligible as initial margin, and the respective haircuts applied
	5.2	Assets Eligible for pre-funded participant contributions to the default resources, and the respective haircuts applied (if different from 5.1)
	5.3	Results of testing of haircuts
6	6.1	For each clearing service, total initial margin required, split by house and client (or combined total if not segregated)
	6.2	For each clearing service, total initial margin held, split by house and client
	6.3	Initial Margin rates on individual contracts, where the CCP sets such rates
	6.4	Type of initial margin model used (e.g. portfolio simulation or risk aggregation) for each clearing service and the key model design parameters for each initial margin model applied to that clearing service
	6.5	Results of back-testing of initial margin. At a minimum, this should include, for each clearing service and each initial margin model applied to that clearing service
	6.6	Average Total Variation Margin Paid to the CCP by participants each business
	6.7	Maximum total variation margin paid to the CCP on any given business day over the period
	6.8	Maximum aggregate initial margin call on any given business day over the period
7	7.1	Liquidity Risk
	7.2	Size and composition of any supplementary liquidity risk resources for each clearing service above those qualifying liquid resources above.
	7.3	Liquidity Risk
12	12.1	Percentage of settlements by value effected using a DvP, DvD or PvP settlement mechanism
	12.2	Percentage of settlements by volume effected using a DvP, DvD or PvP settlement mechanism
13	13.1	Quantitative information related to defaults
14	14.1	Total Client Positions held as a share of notional values cleared or of the settlement value of securities transactions
15	15.1	General business risk
	15.2	General business risk; Financial Disclosures

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PRINCIPLE #	DISCLOSURE #	DISCLOSURE TITLE
	15.3	General business risk; Income breakdown
16	16.1	Total cash (but not securities) received from participants, regardless of the form in which it is held, deposited or invested, split by whether it was received as initial margin or default fund contribution
	16.2	How total cash received from participants (16.1) is held/deposited/invested, including;
	16.3	Rehypothecation of participant assets (ie non-cash)
17	17.1	Operational availability target for the core system(s) involved in clearing (whether or not outsourced) over specified period for the system (e.g. 99.99% over a twelve-month period)
	17.2	Actual availability of the core system(s) over the previous twelve month period
	17.3	Total number of failures
	17.4	Recovery time objective(s)
18	18.1	Number of clearing members, by clearing service
	18.2	Open Position Concentration
	18.3	Initial Margin Concentration
	18.4	Segregated Default Fund Concentration
19	19.1	Tiered participation arrangements, measures of concentration of client clearing
20	20.1	FMI Links, Value of Trades
	20.2	FMI Links, Initial Margin or equivalent financial resources provided
	20.3	FMI Links, Initial Margin or equivalent financial resources collected
	20.4	FMI Links, Results of Back-testing coverage
	20.5	FMI Links, Additional pre-funded financial resources provided to
	20.6	FMI Links, Additional pre-funded financial resources collected from
	20.7	FMI Links, Cross Margining
23	23.1	Disclosure of rules, key procedures, and market data; Average Daily Volumes
	23.2	Disclosure of rules, key procedures, and market data; Non-Yet-Settled
	23.3	Disclosure of rules, key procedures, and market data; Execution Facility
PRC	PRC 1	Payment Risk Committee Disclosure - Concentration Measures

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PRINCIPLE #	DISCLOSURE #	DISCLOSURE TITLE
	PRC 2	Payment Risk Committee Disclosure - Initial Margin Detail

DTCC Public (White)
Page 4 of 25

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In February 2015, CPMI-IOSCO issued its final report on Quantitative Disclosure Standards for Central Counterparties ("CCPs"), which provides specific quantitative disclosure requirements for CCPs relative to a number of the PFMI principles. These disclosures are intended to complement the narrative disclosures included in the CPMI-IOSCO Disclosure Framework*. This document contains the quantitative disclosures for the two divisions of the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation ("FICC") — the Government Securities Division ("GSD") and Mortgage-Backed Securities Division ("MBSD") — and the National Securities Clearing Corporation ("NSCC"). FICC and NSCC are wholly owned subsidiaries of The Depository Trust & CPMI-IOSCO_Quant@dtcc.com.

The attached disclosures include, in addition to those required by CPMI-IOSCO, some supplemental disclosures as proposed by the Payments Risk Committee's Recommendations for Supporting Clearing Member Due Diligence of Central Counterparties (Feb 2013).

The information provided in this disclosure is reported as of the dates specified. For further information, please contact CPMI-IOSCO Quant@dtcc.com.

DTCC Public (White)
Page 5 of 25

^{*} The Disclosure Frameworks for FICC and NSCC can be found at www.dtcc.com

Q1 2024 SUPPLEMENTAL EXPLANATORY NOTE

Management Note

The U.S. equity markets rose during the first quarter of 2024, with the S&P 500 index increasing more than 10%. The rally in equity markets was largely driven by early optimism over the economic conditions, potential interest rate cuts, and the possibilities surrounding Artificial Intelligence. Yields on U.S treasuries rose during the quarter, with 10-year U.S. Treasury yield closing at 4.19% at the quarter end. The treasury yields increased following the announcements by the Fed that interest rate cuts weren't imminent.

FICC-Government Securities Division (GSD)

At the end of the first quarter of 2024, GSD's 12-month backtesting coverage level was 99.9%. The 1-month coverage ratio at GSD was 99.88% for January, 99.88% for February, and 99.96% for March. The largest deficiency for the quarter totaled \$41.1MM observed on 01/08/2024 and was driven by position changes (stemming from off-market transactions). The median backtesting deficiency for the quarter was \$6.5MM.

FICC-Mortgage-Backed Securities Division (MBSD)

At the end of the first quarter of 2024, MBSD's 12-month backtesting coverage level was 99.7%. The 1-month coverage ratio at MBSD was 99.93% for January, 100.00% for February, and 99.76% for March. The largest deficiency for the quarter totaled \$1.0MM observed on 03/13/2024 and was driven by after-hours positions changes. The median backtesting deficiency for the quarter was \$390K.

National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC)

At the end of the first quarter of 2024, NSCC's 12-month backtesting coverage level was 99.9%, with the 1-month coverage ratio for January at 99.92%, February at 99.96%, and March at 99.92%. The median backtesting deficiency for the quarter was \$346K. The largest deficiency for the quarter was \$542K which occurred on 01/18/2024, driven by after-hours positions changes.

Q1 2024 SUPPLEMENTAL EXPLANATORY NOTE

Liquidity Results

GSD, MBSD, and NSCC did not experience a default event nor did any Member fail to satisfy payment obligations in Q1 2024. No simulated default liquidity sufficiency shortfalls were observed in Q1 2024.

For GSD and MBSD, the values are estimated liquidity obligations, post netting that are based on trades that are due to settle the following business day. For NSCC, the values are estimated liquidity obligations that are based on multi-day obligations throughout the (T+2) settlement cycle plus the Long Allocation and CALM offsets. The total reflects, where relevant, intraday and multiday payment obligations that could be caused by the default of any single participant and its affiliates (including transactions cleared for indirect participants) in extreme but plausible market conditions.

The liquidity results reflect NSCC's potential liquidity obligations in a Member default scenario. In a non-default scenario, NSCC's Members have cash obligations for all securities deliveries (buy positions). Those cash obligations are netted with cash received for all securities deliveries (sell positions). If a portfolio is balanced with buys/sells, these settlement amounts will largely offset.

In a default scenario, NSCC is responsible for the receipt of securities from, and payment of cash to, the contra side Members (buy positions). This represents the exposure that is published in this report. NSCC may also need to source securities that the defaulting Member was unable to deliver (sell positions). The liquidity obligations of the sell positions pair-off, as NSCC would exchange settlement proceeds between the two contra side Members. As such, the buy positions drive the potential default liquidity risk that is posed to NSCC, since NSCC would be responsible for the payment of cash required to settle those purchases. Therefore, NSCC's conservative liquidity results derived from a default scenario are not comparable to the non-default settlement obligations of its Members.

Liquidity results also reflect the fact that NSCC receives option activity from the Options Clearing Corporation ("OCC") each business day, but activity on non-expiry dates is not as significant as the activity observed around standard expiration periods. Liquidity obligations are conservatively calculated and liquidity resources are measured assuming the guarantee for OCC options has been transferred to NSCC. Liquidity risk measurement is calibrated extremely conservatively to address uncertainty of potential outcomes; resources are likely to increase during periods of stress over a 4-day default period, but no such increases are taken into account as potential risk mitigation.

NSCC uses Supplemental Liquidity Deposit ("SLD"), a payment obligation, determined by whether the daily liquidity obligation on a business day exceeds the sum of NSCC's qualifying liquid resources ("QLR") available to NSCC, after the application of a wide-range of stressed market assumptions. The SLD payment obligation is based on the calculated QLR and actual liquidity exposure over the upcoming settlement cycle that a Member's daily activity would pose to NSCC on that particular day in the event of that Member's default. NSCC held SLD on deposit for four business days in Q1. SLD is part of NSCC's diversified set of liquidity resources; QLR includes cash deposits to the NSCC Clearing Fund; proceeds of the issuance and private placement of (a) short-term, unsecured notes in the form of commercial paper and extendable notes and (b) term debt; and cash that would be obtained by drawing on NSCC 's committed 364-day credit facility with a consortium of banks. The SLD rule is Rule 4A in the NSCC rulebook that can be accessed via https://www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/legal/rules/nscc_rules.pdf. Full text of the SLD filings may be obtained by visiting the DTCC website at www.dtcc.com/legal/sec-rule-filings.

Disclosure	Disclosure Description		Frequency	Data Type	FIC	cc	NSCC	Explanatory Notes	
Reference					GSD	MBSD			
Disc	losure 4.1 - Total value of default resources (excluding initial and retained variation margin;), split by clear	ing service if o	lefault funds	are segregate	ed by clearin	ng service		
4.1.1	4.1.1 Prefunded - Own Capital Before		Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$MM	86		130	The Company maintains an amount referred to as the corporate contribution, to be applied to losses of the Company as provided in the clearing agency rules. The amount of the corporate contribution is generally equal to 50% of the Company's general business risk capital requirement.	
4.1.2	Prefunded - Own Capital Alongside			USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	N/A		
4.1.3	Prefunded - Own Capital After			USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	N/A		
4.1.4	Prefunded - Aggregate Participant Contributions - Required			USD \$MM	42,956	8,766	11,846	NSCC and each FICC Division calculates and collects Clearing Fund from its Members using a risk-based margin methodology. These amounts (a Member's "Required Fund Deposit") operate as the Member's margin, and the aggregate of all such Members' deposits is, collectively, the Clearing Fund, which operates as NSCC's/FICC (with respect to each division's) default fund.For NSCC, on September 5, 2017, the US cash equities markets moved to a T+2 settlement cycle. Accordingly, after that date, the clearing fund has been calculated to take into account the shortened settlement cycle.	
4.1.5	Prefunded - Aggregate Participant Contributions - Post-Haircut Posted		Ì	USD \$MM	50,531	10,607	12,979		
4.1.6	Prefunded - Other]	USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	N/A		
4.1.7	Committed - Own/parent funds that are committed to address a participant default (or round of participa	ant defaults)		1	USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	N/A	
4.1.8	Committed - Aggregate participant commitments to address an initial participant default (or initial round defaults)	of participant		USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	N/A		
4.1.9	Committed - Aggregate participant commitments to replenish the default fund to deal with a subsequent default (or round of participant defaults) after the initial participant default (or round of participant default addressed.	•		USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	N/A		
4.1.10	Committed - Other			USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	N/A		
Disc	closure 4.2 - Kccp - Quarter End								
4.2.1	Kccp - Kccp need only be reported by those CCPs which are, or seek to be a "qualifying CCP" under relevan	nt law.	Quarterly	USD \$MM	733	N/A	N/A		
Disc	closure 4.3 - Value of pre-funded default resources (excluding initial and retained variation n	margin) held fo	r each clearin	g service					
4.3.1.1	Cash deposited at a central bank of issue of the currency concerned	Pre Haircut	Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$MM	13,479	3,274	11,487		
4.3.1.2		Post Haircut		USD \$MM	13,479	3,274	11,487		
4.3.2.1	Cash deposited at other central banks	Pre Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0		

CPMI-IOSCO Quantitative Disclosures - DTCC

As of March 28, 2024

closure	Disclosure Description		Frequency	Data Type	FIC	cc	NSCC	Explanatory Notes
ference					GSD	MBSD		
4.3.2.2		Post Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
4.3.3.1	Secured cash deposited at commercial banks (including reverse repo)	Pre Haircut]	USD \$MM	0	0	0	
4.3.3.2		Post Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
4.3.4.1	Unsecured cash deposited at commercial banks	Pre Haircut]	USD \$MM	500	125	500	See Explanatory Note from 4.1
4.3.4.2		Post Haircut]	USD \$MM	500	125	500	
4.3.4.1	Unsecured cash invested in Money Market Mutual Funds	Pre Haircut]	USD \$MM	0	0	0	See Explanatory Note from 4.1
4.3.4.2		Post Haircut]	USD \$MM	0	0	0	
4.3.4.1	Unsecured cash invested in US Treasury Bills	Pre Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0	See Explanatory Note from 4.1
4.3.4.2		Post Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
4.3.5.1	Non-Cash Sovereign Government Bonds - Domestic	Pre Haircut		USD \$MM	31,832	6,909	1,024	See Explanatory Note from 4.1
4.3.5.2	Non-Cash Sovereign Government Bonds - Domestic; Reported as at quarter end; Pre-Haircut and Post-Haircut	Post Haircut		USD \$MM	30,675	6,669	993	
4.3.6.1	Non-Cash Sovereign Government Bonds - Other	Pre Haircut	Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$MM	0	0	0	
4.3.6.2	Non-Cash Sovereign Government Bonds - Other; Reported as at quarter end; Pre-Haircut and Post-Haircut	Post Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
4.3.7.1	Non-Cash Agency Bonds	Pre Haircut]	USD \$MM	6,283	578	0	See Explanatory Note from 4.1
4.3.7.2	Non-Cash Agency Bonds; Reported as at quarter end; Pre-Haircut and Post-Haircut	Post Haircut		USD \$MM	5,843	537	0	
4.3.8.1	Non-Cash State/municipal bonds	Pre Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
4.3.8.2	Non-Cash State/municipal bonds; Reported as at quarter end; Pre-Haircut and Post-Haircut	Post Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
4.3.9.1	Non-Cash Corporate bonds	Pre Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
4.3.9.2	Non-Cash Corporate bonds; Reported as at quarter end; Pre-Haircut and Post-Haircut	Post Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
4.3.10.1	Non-Cash Equities	Pre Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
4.3.10.2	Non-Cash Equities; Reported as at quarter end; Pre-Haircut and Post-Haircut	Post Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
4.3.11.1	Non-Cash Commodities - Gold	Pre Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
4.3.11.2	Non-Cash Commodities - Gold; Reported as at quarter end; Pre-Haircut and Post-Haircut	Post Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0	

Disclosure	Disclosure Description		Frequency	Data Type	FICC		NSCC	Explanatory Notes
Reference					GSD	MBSD		
4.3.12.1	Non-Cash Commodities - Other	Pre Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
	Non-Cash Commodities - Other; Reported as at quarter end; Pre-Haircut and Post-Haircut	Post Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
4.3.13.1	Non-Cash Commodities - Mutual Funds / UCITs	Pre Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
l	Non-Cash Commodities - Mutual Funds / UCITs; Reported as at quarter end; Pre-Haircut and Post-Haircut	Post Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
4.3.14.1	Non-Cash Commodities - Other	Pre Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
	Non-Cash Commodities - Other; Reported as at quarter end; Pre-Haircut and Post-Haircut	Post Haircut		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
4.3.15.1	In total. Reported as at quarter end; Pre-Haircut and Post-Haircut	Pre Haircut		USD \$MM	52,094	10,886	13,011	
4.3.15.2		Post Haircut		USD \$MM	50,497	10,605	12,979	

Disc	closure 4.4 - Credit Risk Disclosures							
4.4.1	State whether the CCP is subject to a minimum "Cover 1" or "Cover 2" requirement in relation to total proresources.	e-funded default	Quarterly		Cover 1	Cover 1	Cover 1	
4.4.2	For each clearing service, state the number of business days within which the CCP assumes it will close ou when calculating credit exposures that would potentially need to be covered by the default fund.			Bus. Days	3	3	3	This is our risk horizon for liquidation and hedging of market risk.
4.4.3.1	For each clearing service, the estimated largest aggregate stress loss (in excess of initial margin) that would be caused by the default of any single participant and its affiliates (including transactions cleared for indirect participants) in extreme but plausible market conditions. (Previous 12 Months)	Peak Day/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	3,307	3,022	2,993	Amounts correspond to largest Cover 1 ratio. This may not correspond to the largest stress loss amount observed during the look-back period.
4.4.3.2		Mean Avg/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	1,831	2,258	636	
4.4.4	Report the number of business days, if any, on which the above amount (4.4.3) exceeded actual pre-funderesources (in excess of initial margin).	ed default		Bus. Days	0	0	0	
4.4.5	The amount in 4.4.3 which exceeded actual pre-funded default resources (in excess of initial margin) (Previous 12 Months)	Amt Exceeded/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
	For each clearing service, the actual largest aggregate credit exposure (in excess of initial margin) to any single participant and its affiliates (including transactions cleared for indirect participants) (Previous 12 Months)	Peak Day/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	200	154	38	Amount represents Peak/Average VaR model back test results.
4.4.6.2		Avg/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	21	80	4	
4.4.7.1	For each clearing service, the estimated largest aggregate stress loss (in excess of initial margin) that would be caused by the default of any two participants and their affiliates (including transactions cleared for indirect participants) in extreme but plausible market conditions (Previous 12 Months)	Peak Day/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	5,368	4,544	4,360	Amounts correspond to largest Cover 2 ratio. This may not correspond to the largest Cover-2 stress loss amount observed during the look-back period.

DTCC Public (White)
Page 10 of 25

Disclosure	Disclosure Description		Frequency	Data Type	FIC	cc	NSCC	Explanatory Notes
Reference					GSD	MBSD		
4.4.7.2		Mean Avg/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	3,217	3,809	927	
4.4.8	Number of business days, if any, on which the above amount (4.4.7) exceeded actual pre-funded default excess of initial margin) and by how much.	resources (in		Bus. Days	0	0	0	Total number of business days where the largest Cover 2 ratio per day exceeded 100% for the last 12 months of this test period. Excess amounts above pre-funded default resources (ir excess of initial margin) corresponding to these business days are referenced below in 4.4.9 explanatory notes, when applicable.
4.4.9	The amount in 4.4.7 which exceeded actual pre-funded default resources (in excess of initial margin) (Previous 12 Months)	Amt Exceeded/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
	For each clearing service, what was the actual largest aggregate credit exposure (in excess of initial margin) to any two participants and their affiliates (including transactions cleared for indirect participants)? (Previous 12 Months)	Peak Day/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	244	295	58	Amount represents Peak/Average VaR model back test results.
4.4.10.2		Avg/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	29	146	5	
Disc	losure 5.1 - Assets eligible as initial margin, and the respective haircuts applied							
5.1.1	Assets eligible as initial margin and the respective haircuts applied		Update as changes are made	Website/ Hyperlink	edia/Files/Do	/-/media/Fil es/Downloa ds/legal/ris k-	https://www. dtcc.com/-/m edia/Files/Do wnloads/legal /risk- management/ NSCC-Haircut- Schedule- Current.pdf	
Disc	losure 5.2 - Assets Eligible for pre-funded participant contributions to the default resources	, and the respec	ctive haircuts	applied (if di	fferent from 5	5.1)		
	Assets Eligible for pre-funded participant contributions to the default resources, and the respective hairce different from 5.1)	uts applied (if	Update as changes are made		See 5.1	See 5.1	See 5.1	
Disc	losure 5.3 - Results of testing of haircuts							
5.3.1	Confidence interval targeted through the calculation of haircuts		Quarterly	Percentage	99.00%	99.00%	99.00%	
5.3.2	Assumed holding/liquidation period for the assets accepted			Bus. Days	3	3	3	See Explanatory Note from 4.4.2

margin model applied to that clearing service

As of March 28, 2024

closure	Disclosure Description		Frequency	Data Type	FIC	С	NSCC	Explanatory Notes	
erence					GSD	MBSD			
5.3.3	Look-back period used for testing the haircuts				10+ years	10+ years	10+ years	For Treasury and Agencies the lookback period, "10+ years", starts Jan 1, 2008 and continues to the last day of this quarte tested & reported herewith. Similar to current scenario selection or retention approach, where Historic Stress Scenar Dates are selected from a timespan of more than 10 years (utilizing a fixed start date and extending the end date), or retained for all Historic Scenario Dates previously derived which are on or after Jan 1, 2008. For Mortgages, Historic Stress Scenarios are selected from a 10+ years look-back peristarting in 2002 and applied to CUSIPs selected from the 3 months of the quarterly test period.	
5.3.4	5.3.4 Number of days during the look-back period on which the fall in value during the assumed holding/liquidation period exceeded the haircut on an asset.			Bus. Days	Treasury total of 3 days. Mortgages total of 61 days. Agency 0 days.	Treasury total of 3 days. Mortgages total of 61 days. Agency 0 days.	Treasury total of 3 days. Mortgages total of 61 days. Agency 0 days.	See 5.1 for list of eligible assets and the respective haircuts applied. For Treasuries, based on the "10 years +" lookback period (including 2008 and onward), 1 days for 20 yrs. and 3 days for 30 yrs. tenors were observed, where a change in rate caused a breach of respective HC. The total day count for Treasuries is 3 (of which 1 days caused a breach for both tenors, 20 & 30 yrs.). For Mortgages there were 61 days in Q1 2024 where at least one breach occurred. In total, the stress return (loss) for 24 CUSIPs under two histor stress scenarios breached the current HC. For Agencies no breaches were observed under current HCs.	
		-							
Disc	losure 6.1 - Total initial margin required split by house, client gross, client net and total (if n	not segregated)							
	losure 6.1 - Total initial margin required split by house, client gross, client net and total (if n Total initial margin required split by house, client gross, client net and total (if not segregated)	House (Net)	Quarterly	USD \$MM	42,956	8,766	11,846	See Explanatory Note from 4.1.41 Not applicable. GSD/MBSD/NSCC does not hold client margin. See NSCC/FIC Disclosure Frameworks, Principle 14 discussion.	
				USD \$MM USD \$MM	42,956 N/A	8,766 N/A	11,846 N/A	GSD/MBSD/NSCC does not hold client margin. See NSCC/FIC	
6.1.1.1		House (Net)			,	ŕ	,	GSD/MBSD/NSCC does not hold client margin. See NSCC/FIG	
6.1.1.1		House (Net) Client (Gross)		USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	N/A	GSD/MBSD/NSCC does not hold client margin. See NSCC/FIG	
6.1.1.1 6.1.1.2 6.1.1.3 6.1.1.4		House (Net) Client (Gross) Client (Net) Total	Quarterly	USD \$MM USD \$MM USD \$MM	N/A N/A	N/A N/A	N/A N/A	GSD/MBSD/NSCC does not hold client margin. See NSCC/FI	

isclosure	Disclosure Description		Frequency	Data Type	FIC	cc	NSCC	Explanatory Notes
eference					GSD	MBSD		
6.4.1	Type of initial margin model used (e.g. portfolio simulation or risk aggregation) for each clearing service a model design parameters for each initial margin model applied to that clearing service	nd the key	Update as changes are made		Historical Simulation + Haircut	Historical Simulation + Haircut	Parametric VaR + Haircut	
Disc serv	losure 6.5 - Results of back-testing of initial margin. At a minimum, this should include, for ice	each clearing s	ervice and ea	ch initial marg	gin model app	olied to that	clearing	
6.5.1.1	Number of times over the past twelve months that margin coverage held against any account fell below the actual mark-to-market exposure of that member account – based on daily back-testing results	Once-a-day/ Previous 12 Months	Quarterly	Count	42	54	34	
6.5.2	Number of observations ([Number of accounts * number of days])	Previous 12 Months		Count	30,671	15,643	31,691	
6.5.3	Achieved coverage level [aggregate CCP-level backtest coverage]	Previous 12 Months		Percentage	99.86%	99.65%	99.89%	Aggregate CCP-level backtest coverage (SEC Mthly Back Terreport)
6.5.4	Where breaches of initial margin coverage (as defined in 6.5(a)) have occurred, report on size of uncovered exposure	Peak Size/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	149	140	1,162	Peak Coverage Level at CC Level over the last 12-month at quarter-end
6.5.5		Average Size/ Previous 12 Months		USD \$MM	14	15	37	Average magnitude of Backtest deficiencies over last 12 months
Disc	losure 6.6 - Average Total Variation Margin Paid to the CCP by participants each business							
6.6.1	Average Total Variation Margin Paid to the CCP by participants each business day	Average	Quarterly	USD \$MM	8,509	511	806	For GSD and MBSD, VM is a cash pass-through process acre the Members; for NSCC, VM charges are included as part o Clearing Fund requirements.
								MTM debits were aggregated across all Members to reflect variation margin paid to all Members.
Disc	losure 6.7 - Maximum total variation margin paid to the CCP on any given business day ove	r the period						
6.7.1	Maximum total variation margin paid to the CCP on any given business day over the period	Maximum	Quarterly	USD \$MM	12,950	1,827	3,741	See Explanatory Note from 6.6
Disc	losure 6.8 - Maximum aggregate initial margin call on any given business day over the perio	od						
6.8.1	Maximum aggregate initial margin call on any given business day over the period	Maximum	Quarterly	USD \$MM	3,467	1,543	6,388	Amount represents the largest aggregate deficit over amount on deposit. This is the actual call made, to be reduced by a excess collateral that was held. Call amount would be inclused any intraday calls made.
Disc	losure 7.1 - Liquidity Risk							
7.1.1	State whether the clearing service maintains sufficient liquid resources to 'Cover 1' or 'Cover 2'.		Quarterly/ Quarter End		Cover 1	Cover 1	Cover 1	
7.1.2	Size and composition of qualifying liquid resources for each clearing service; (a) Cash deposited at a centr of the currency concerned	al bank of issue		USD \$MM	13,479	3,274	22,060	

Disclosure	Disclosure Description		Frequency	Data Type	FI	сс	NSCC	Explanatory Notes
Reference					GSD	MBSD		
7.1.3	Size and composition of qualifying liquid resources for each clearing service; (b) Cash deposited at other c	central banks		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
7.1.4	Size and composition of qualifying liquid resources for each clearing service; (c) Secured cash deposited at commercial banks (including reverse repo)	Repo Only		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
7.1.5	Size and composition of qualifying liquid resources for each clearing service; (d) Unsecured cash deposited at commercial banks	Commercial Bank Deposits		USD \$MM	500	125	1,500	
		Money Market Funds		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
		US Treasury Bills		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
7.1.6	7.1.6 Size and composition of qualifying liquid resources for each clearing service; (e) secured committed lines of credit (ie those for which collateral/security will be provided by the CCP if drawn) including committed foreign exchange swaps and committed repos			USD \$MM	96,483	66,139	9,495	For FICC, amount represents the assigned total amount of rules-based facility, Capped Contingency Liquidity Facility ("CCLF") for the reported quarter. For NSCC, the amount represents a secured line of credit with a syndicate of lenders
7.1.7	Size and composition of qualifying liquid resources for each clearing service; (f) unsecured committed line which the CCP may draw without providing collateral/security)	es of credit (ie		USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	N/A	
7.1.8	Size and composition of qualifying liquid resources for each clearing service; (g) highly marketable collate custody and investments that are readily available and convertible into cash with prearranged and highly arrangements even in extreme but plausible market conditions			USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	N/A	
7.1.9	Size and composition of qualifying liquid resources for each clearing service; (h) other			USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	0	For GSD and MBSD, the portfolio of a defaulting member, comprised of highly marketable collateral would also be available as a liquidity resource. Value and composition of the portfolio would vary by day and by member. For GSD/MBSD, amount represents the Repo Value of Underlying Securities. NSCC's Supplemental Liquidity Deposit ("SLD") program provides for additional rules-based liquidity. Option expiry settlement cycles typically present elevated liquidity needs to NSCC. Members may be required to provide additional fundit based on historical activity. Sizing of supplemental liquidity resources will vary based on the historical activity presented NSCC's largest members as well as market dynamics during the current settlement cycle. As of 3/28/24 there were no SLD deposits on hand. Please see Supplemental Note for addition information. Resources reported in Section 7.1 are as of 3/28/24 and do n correspond to the dates of the actual largest obligations.
7.1.10	State whether the CCP has routine access to central bank liquidity or facilities.				N/A	N/A	N/A	3.00
7.1.11	Details regarding the schedule of payments or priority for allocating payments, if such exists, and any app policy, procedure, and governance arrangement around such decision making.	olicable rule,			N/A	N/A	N/A	No schedule of payments or priority for allocating payments exists.

Disclosure 7.2 - Size and composition of any supplementary liquidity risk resources for each clearing service above those qualifying liquid resources above.

DTCC Public (White)
Page 14 of 25

isclosure	Disclosure Description	Frequency	Data Type	FIC	cc	NSCC	Explanatory Notes
eference				GSD	MBSD		
7.2.1	Size and composition of any supplementary liquidity risk resources for each clearing service above those qualifying liquid resources in 7.1	Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$MM	0	0	N/A	FICC has entered into uncommitted master repurchase agreements ("MRAs") which it may look to as a liquidity source in addition to the resources discussed in the explanatory note from 7.1. These are not designated as qualifying liquid resources. Amounts available under the MRAs cannot be quantified.
Disc	osure 7.3 - Liquidity Risk						
	Estimated largest same-day and, where relevant, intraday and multiday payment obligation in total that would be caused by the default of any single participant and its affiliates (including transactions cleared for indirect participants) in extreme but plausible market conditions	Forward looking/ Quarterly	USD \$MM	68,502	31,794	43,758	See Supplemental Note.
7.3.2	Number of business days, if any, on which the above amount exceeded its qualifying liquid resources (identified as in 7.1, and available at the point the breach occurred), and by how much.	Quarterly	Bus. Days	0	0	0	See Supplemental Note
7.3.3			USD \$MM	0	0	0	NSCC reflects multi-day settlement obligations. GSD obligations that are based on trades that are due to settle the following business day plus FOS. MBSD obligations are based on bilateral trades due to settle the next business day plus FOS
7.3.4	Actual largest intraday and multiday payment obligation of a single participant and its affiliates (including transactions cleared for indirect participants) over the past twelve months; Peak day amount in previous twelve months	Previous 12 Months	USD \$MM	74,345	31,794	44,743	See Supplemental Note.
7.3.5	Estimated largest same-day and, where relevant, intraday and multiday payment obligation in each relevant currency that would be caused by the default of any single participant and its affiliates (including transactions cleared for indirect participants) in extreme but plausible market conditions	Forward looking/ Quarterly	USD \$MM	68,502	31,794	43,758	See Supplemental Note.
7.3.6	Number of business days, if any, on which the above amounts exceeded its qualifying liquid resources in each relevant currency (as identified in 7.1 and available at the point the breach occurred), and by how much	Quarterly	Bus. Days	0	0	0	See Supplemental Note
7.3.7			USD \$MM	0	0	0	
Disc	osure 12.1 - Percentage of settlements by value effected using a DvP, DvD or PvP settlement mechanism						
12.1.1	Percentage of settlements by value effected using a DvP settlement mechanism	Quarterly	Percentage	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	FICC data provided with respect to GSD GCF Repo and non-GCF Repo CCP services and MBSD clearing services. NSCC data provided with respect to CNS, NSCC's CCP service, which uses a model 2 DvP Settlement mechanism.
12.1.2	Percentage of settlements by value effected using a DvD settlement mechanism		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	
12.1.3	Percentage of settlements by value effected using a PvP settlement mechanism		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Disc	osure 12.2 - Percentage of settlements by volume effected using a DvP, DvD or PvP settlement mechanisn	n					
12.2.1	Percentage of settlements by volume effected using a DvP settlement mechanism	Quarterly	Percentage	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	FICC data provided with respect to GSD GCF Repo and non-GC Repo CCP services and MBSD clearing services. NSCC data provided with respect to CNS, NSCC's CCP service, which uses a model 2 DvP Settlement mechanism.

Disclosure	Disclosure Description	Frequency	Data Type	FI	сс	NSCC	Explanatory Notes
Reference				GSD	MBSD		
12.2.2	Percentage of settlements by volume effected using a DvD settlement mechanism		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	
12.2.3	Percentage of settlements by volume effected using a PvP settlement mechanism		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Disc	losure 13.1 - Quantitative information related to defaults						
13.1.1	Quantitative information related to defaults; Amount of loss versus amount of initial margin	Ad-hoc		N/A	N/A	N/A	
13.1.2	Quantitative information related to defaults; Amount of other financial resources used to cover losses	1		N/A	N/A	N/A	
13.1.3.1	Quantitative information related to defaults; Proportion of client positions closed-out	ĺ		N/A	N/A	N/A	
13.1.3.2	Quantitative information related to defaults; Proportion of client positions ported	ĺ		N/A	N/A	N/A	
13.1.4	Quantitative information related to defaults; Appropriate references to other published material related to the defaults			N/A	N/A	N/A	
Disc	: losure 14.1 - Total Client Positions held as a share of notional values cleared or of the settlement value of s	securities tran	sactions				
14.1.1	Total Client Positions held in individually segregated accounts	Quarterly/ Quarter End	Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	Not applicable for the US cash markets. GSD/MBSD/NSCC doe not maintain separate "house" and "client" accounts for its Members. See NSCC and FICC Disclosure Frameworks, Principle 14 discussion.
14.1.2	Total Client Positions held in omnibus client-only accounts, other than LSOC accounts	1	Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	
14.1.3	Total Client Positions held in legally segregated but operationally comingled (LSOC) accounts	Ì	Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	
14.1.4	Total Client Positions held in comingled house and client accounts		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Disc	losure 15.1 - General business risk						
15.1.1	Value of liquid net assets funded by equity	Annual	USD \$MM	4	07	686	Quarter-end
15.1.2	Six months of current operating expenses		USD \$MM	1	71	261	Quarter-end
Disc	losure 15.2 - General business risk; Financial Disclosures						
15.2.1	Total Revenue	Annual	USD \$MM	4	22	627	Calculated on a trailing 12-month basis
15.2.2	Total Expenditure	ĺ	USD \$MM	3	60	498	Calculated on a trailing 12-month basis
15.2.3	Profits]	USD \$MM	6	52	130	Calculated on a trailing 12-month basis
15.2.4	Total Assets		USD \$MM	62,	891	25,560	Quarter-end
15.2.5	Total Liabilities]	USD \$MM	62,	484	24,874	Quarter-end
15.2.6	Explain if collateral posted by clearing participants is held on or off the CCP's balance sheet				is held on e Sheet	Collateral is held on Balance Sheet	

DTCC Public (White)
Page 16 of 25

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Disclosure Reference	Disclosure Description	Frequency	Data Type	FIC GSD	MBSD	NSCC	Explanatory Notes
15.2.7	Additional items as necessary			n/	a	N/A	
Disc	osure 15.3 - General business risk; Income breakdown						
15.3.1	Percentage of total income that comes from fees related to provision of clearing services	Annual	Percentage	99.6	2%	98.45%	Calculated on a trailing 12-month basis
15.3.2	Percentage of total income that comes from the reinvestment (or rehypothecation) of assets provided by clearing participants		Percentage	n/	a	N/A	Calculated on a trailing 12-month basis
	osure 16.1 - Total cash (but not securities) received from participants, regardless of the form in which it is al margin or default fund contribution	held, deposit	ed or invested	l, split by who	ether it was	received as	
16.1.1	Total cash (but not securities) received from participants, regardless of the form in which it is held, deposited or invested, received as initial margin	Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$MM	13,979	3,399	11,987	See Explanatory Note from 4.1
16.1.2	Total cash (but not securities) received from participants, regardless of the form in which it is held, deposited or invested, received as default fund contribution		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
Disc	osure 16.2 - How total cash received from participants (16.1) is held/deposited/invested, including;						
16.2.1	Percentage of total participant cash held as cash deposits (including through reverse repo)	Quarterly/ Quarter End	Percentage	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	
16.2.2	Percentage of total participant cash held as cash deposits (including through reverse repo); as cash deposits at central banks of issue of the currency deposited		Percentage	96.42%	96.32%	95.83%	
16.2.3	Percentage of total participant cash held as cash deposits (including through reverse repo); as cash deposits at other central banks		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	
16.2.4	Percentage of total participant cash held as cash deposits (including through reverse repo); as cash deposits at commercial banks (Secured, including through reverse repo)		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	
16.2.5	Percentage of total participant cash held as cash deposits (including through reverse repo); as cash deposits at commercial banks (Unsecured)		Percentage	3.58%	3.68%	4.17%	
16.2.6	Percentage of total participant cash held as cash deposits (including through reverse repo); in money market funds		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	
16.2.7	Percentage of total participant cash held as cash deposits (including through reverse repo); in other forms		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	
16.2.8	Percentage of total participant cash held as cash deposits (including through reverse repo); percentage split by currency of these cash deposits (including reverse repo) and money market funds by CCY; Specify local currency in comments		Percentage	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	All investments are in USD
16.2.9	Weighted average maturity of these cash deposits (including reverse repo) and money market funds		Bus. Days	1	1	1	All investments are overnight
16.2.10	Percentage of total participant cash invested in securities; Domestic sovereign government bonds		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	
16.2.11	Percentage of total participant cash invested in securities; Other sovereign government bonds		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	
16.2.12	Percentage of total participant cash invested in securities; Agency Bonds		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	
16.2.13	Percentage of total participant cash invested in securities; State/municipal bonds		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	
16.2.14	Percentage of total participant cash invested in securities; Other instruments		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	

Disclosure	Disclosure Description		Frequency	Data Type	FI	cc	NSCC	Explanatory Notes
Reference					GSD	MBSD		
16.2.15	Percentage of total participant cash invested in securities; percentage split by currency of these securities currency in comments;	; Specify local		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	All investments are in USD
16.2.16	Weighted average maturity of cash received from participants invested in securities. The maturity should number of days.	aturity of cash received from participants invested in securities. The maturity should be reported as		Bus. Days	N/A	N/A	N/A	
16.2.17	Provide an estimate of the risk on the investment portfolio (excluding central bank and commercial bank one-day VaR, or equivalent)	de an estimate of the risk on the investment portfolio (excluding central bank and commercial bank deposits) (99% lay VaR, or equivalent)		USD \$MM	<1	<1	<1	
16.2.18	State if the CCP investment policy sets a limit on the proportion of the investment portfolio that may be a single counterparty, and the size of that limit.				Yes	Yes	Yes	Size of limits will vary depending on credit rating and other factors.
16.2.19	State the number of times over the previous quarter in which this limit has been exceeded.	nber of times over the previous quarter in which this limit has been exceeded.		Count	0	0	0	
Disc	losure 16.3 - Rehypothecation of participant assets (ie non-cash)							
16.3.1	Total value of participant non-cash rehypothecated (Initial margin)	ated (Initial margin)		USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	N/A	
16.3.2	Total value of participant non-cash rehypothecated (Default fund)			USD \$MM	0	0	0	Rehypothecation of clearing fund securities used for liquidi purposes only in the event of a default
16.3.3.1	Rehypothecation of participant assets (ie non-cash) by the CCP where allowed; initial margin; over the following maturities: Overnight/one day; one day and up to one week; One week and up to one month; One month and up to one year; One year and up to two years; Over two years	ON_1D		USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	N/A	
16.3.3.2		1D_1W		USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	N/A	
16.3.3.3		1W_1M		USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	N/A	
16.3.3.4		1M_1Y		USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	N/A	
16.3.3.5		1Y_2Y		USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	N/A	
16.3.3.6		2Y+		USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	N/A	
	Rehypothecation of participant assets (ie non-cash); default fund; over the following maturities: Overnight/one day; one day and up to one week; One week and up to one month; One month and up to one year; One year and up to two years; Over two years	ON_1D		USD \$MM	0	0	0	Rehypothecation of clearing fund securities used for liquidi purposes only in the event of a default
16.3.4.2		1D_1W		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
16.3.4.3		1W_1M		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
16.3.4.4		1M_1Y		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
16.3.4.5		1Y_2Y		USD \$MM	0	0	0	
16.3.4.6		2Y+		USD \$MM	0	0	0	

Disclosure 17.1 - Operational availability target for the core system(s) involved in clearing (whether or not outsourced) over specified period for the system

DTCC Public (White)
Page 18 of 25

Disclosure	Disclosure Description	Frequency	Data Type	FIC	c	NSCC	Explanatory Notes
Reference				GSD	MBSD		
17.1.:	Operational availability target for the core system(s) involved in clearing (whether or not outsourced) over specified period for the system	Quarterly	Percentage	99.60%	99.60%	99.60%	This target and the actual results below are calculated at the individual product-line level and then averaged across all of the systems identified below, in accordance with the established calculation for the applicable SLA.
Dis	closure 17.2 - Actual availability of the core system(s) over the previous twelve month period						
17.2.:	Actual availability of the core system(s) over the previous twelve month period	Quarterly	Percentage	99.86%	N/A	99.69%	Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity (Regulation SCI) events for NSCC, GSD, and MBSD over the previous twelve month period are reviewed for Disclosure 17.3 reporting. Regulation SCI events that impact core systems used in clearing that enable the acceptance and novation of trades, and enable the calculation of margin and settlement obligations are assessed by Risk Management, Product Management, Regulation SCI personnel, and Legal to confirm total number of incidents and duration of failures. Incidents that do not result in a direct business impact to clients are not reported as a failure for Disclosure 17.3. During Q1 2023, processing issues were encountered on DTCC's mainframe impacting ATP and other systems for 4 hours and 34 minutes. In Q4 2022, on two separate occassions, Clearing Fund Letters were regenerated after the client delivery SLA time by 2 hours and 10 minutes and then 8 minutes. In another instance, a network disruption caused the delay of settling bank acknowledgement by 1 hour and 54 minutes. Manual processing caused the unavailability of intraday VaR calculations for 2 hours and 45 minutes.

Disclosure 17.3 - Total number of failures

Disclosure	Disclosure Description	Frequency	Data Type	FIC	cc	NSCC	Explanatory Notes
Reference				GSD	MBSD		
17.3.1	Total number of failures and duration affecting the core system(s) involved in clearing over the previous twelve month period (Duration of Failure)	Quarterly	Count / hh:mm:ss		4 / 2:21:00		Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity (Regulation SCI) events for NSCC, GSD, and MBSD over the previous twelve month period are reviewed for Disclosure 17.3 reporting. Regulation SCI events that impact core systems used in clearing that enable the acceptance and novation of trades, and enable the calculation of margin and settlement obligations are assessed by Risk Management, Product Management, Regulation SCI personnel, and Legal to confirm total number of incidents and duration of failures. Incidents that do not result in a direct business impact to clients are not reported as a failure for Disclosure 17.3. During Q3, duplicate valued settlement transactions were ingested, creating out of balance conditions for clients. Executing reversals to remediate this condition delayed both the NSCC output from night cycle by approximately 6 hours as well as the NSCC Clearing Fund requirements by 58 minutes. Although night cycle was delayed, NSCC maintained its ability to accept transactions. Therefore, the availability calculation is limited to the 58 minutes. In Q2 2023, there were three instances where Clearing Fund Letters breached the SLA, two times within NSCC for 18 minutes and 13 minutes and one time within GSD for 52 minutes.
Disc	losure 17.4 - Recovery time objective(s)						
17.4.1	Recovery time objective(s) (e.g. within two hours)	Quarterly	Time	Within 2 Hours	Within 2 Hours	Within 2 Hours	Recovery time objective is within 2 hours.
Disc	closure 18.1 - Number of clearing members, by clearing service						For GSD, there are Broker/Dealers, Government Sponsored Entities, Banks, and Hedge Funds For MBSD, there are Broker/Dealers, Hedge Fund, Mortgage Companies, Government Sponsored Entities, Registered Investment Companies, etc. For NSCC there are Broker/Dealers, certain stock exchanges (for omnibus account reporting), and one CSD.
18.1.1.1	Number of general clearing members	Quarterly/ Quarter End	Count	142	74	66	FICC does not distinguish membership categories between members that clear for others and self-clearing. Accordingly, the total number of FICC members are reported here.
18.1.1.2	Number of direct clearing members		Count	0	0	83	
18.1.1.3	Number of others category (Describe in comments)		Count	0	0	0	Numbers do not include types of members that are not eligible for CCP services: GSD Comparison-Only members, MBSD Electronic Pool Notification (EPN)-only members, and NSCC has several limited membership categories that are not reported here.
18.1.2.1	Number of central bank participants		Count	0	0	0	

isclosure	Disclosure Description		Frequency	Data Type	FIC	cc	NSCC	Explanatory Notes
eference					GSD	MBSD		
18.1.2.2	Number of CCP participants			Count	0	0	0	
18.1.2.3	Number of bank participants			Count	48	15	14	
18.1.2.4	Number of other participants (Describe in comments)			Count	94	59	135	Includes Broker/dealers, Stock Exchanges, CSD's and Trust members. Excludes Banks.
18.1.3.1	Number of domestic participants			Count	99	70	146	
18.1.3.2	Number of foreign participants			Count	43	4	3	US Branches/Agencies of Non US legal entities will be considered Non-US (foreign)
Disc	losure 18.2 - Open Position Concentration							
18.2.1.1	For each clearing service with ten or more members, but fewer than 25 members; Percentage of open positions held by the largest five clearing members, including both house and client, in aggregate	Average End of Day	Quarterly	Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	
18.2.1.2		Peak End of Day		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	
18.2.2.1	For each clearing service with 25 or more members; Percentage of open positions held by the largest five clearing members, including both house and client, in aggregate	Average End of Day		Percentage	27.72%	53.24%	36.69%	
18.2.2.2		Peak End of Day		Percentage	30.97%	56.21%	38.60%	
18.2.3.1	For each clearing service with 25 or more members; Percentage of open positions held by the largest ten clearing members, including both house and client, in aggregate	Average End of Day		Percentage	43.77%	75.84%	53.72%	
18.2.3.2		Peak End of Day		Percentage	45.55%	78.76%	57.60%	
Disc	losure 18.3 - Initial Margin Concentration							
18.3.1.1	For each clearing service with ten or more members, but fewer than 25 members; Percentage of initial margin posted by the largest five clearing members, including both house and client, in aggregate	Average End of Day	Quarterly	Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	Under NSCC's and each of FICC Division's current rules and structure, they do not maintain separate Guaranty Funds. NSCC and each FICC Division collect Clearing Fund deposits from their Members using a risk-based margin methodology. These amounts operate, individually, as the Member's margand the aggregate of all such Members' deposits* is referred to, collectively, as the Clearing Fund, which operates as NSC and each of FICC Division's default fund. * Member's deposits include excess deposits exceeding the requirement that can be withdrawn by members.
18.3.1.2	For each clearing service with ten or more members, but fewer than 25 members; Percentage of initial margin posted by the largest five clearing members, including both house and client, in aggregate; Average and Peak over the quarter	Peak End of Day		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	
18.3.2.1	For each clearing service with 25 or more members; Percentage of initial margin posted by the largest five clearing members, including both house and client, in aggregate	Average End of Day		Percentage	34.28%	51.04%	30.40%	
	For each clearing service with 25 or more members; Percentage of initial margin posted by the largest	Peak End of	1					

Disclosure	Disclosure Description		Frequency	Data Type	FIC	cc	NSCC	Explanatory Notes
Reference					GSD	MBSD		
18.3.3.1	For each clearing service with 25 or more members; Percentage of initial margin posted by the largest ten clearing members, including both house and client, in aggregate	Average End of Day		Percentage	54.58%	71.91%	45.88%	
18.3.3.2	For each clearing service with 25 or more members; Percentage of initial margin posted by the largest ten clearing members, including both house and client, in aggregate; Average and Peak over the quarter	Peak End of Day		Percentage	55.89%	74.24%	50.90%	
Disc	closure 18.4 - Segregated Default Fund Concentration							
18.4.1	18.4.1 For each segregated default fund with ten or more members, but fewer than 25 members; Percentage of participant contributions to the default fund contributed by largest five clearing members in aggregate		Quarterly/ Quarter End	Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	See Explanatory Note from 18.3
18.4.2	For each segregated default fund with 25 or more members; Percentage of participant contributions to t contributed by largest five clearing members in aggregate	irticipant contributions to the default fund		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	
18.4.3	For each segregated default fund with 25 or more members; Percentage of participant contributions to t contributed by largest ten clearing members in aggregate	he default fund		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Disc	closure 19.1 - Tiered participation arrangements, measures of concentration of client clearin	ıg						
19.1.1	Number of clients (if known)		Quarterly/ Quarter End	Count	N/A	N/A	N/A	See Explanatory Note from 14.1
19.1.2	Number of direct members that clear for clients			Count	N/A	N/A	66	NSCC: Number denotes members that clear for other Broker/Dealers.
19.1.3.1	Percent of client transactions attributable to the top five clearing members (if CCP has 10+ clearing mem	bers); Peak		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	See Explanatory Note from 14.1
19.1.3.2	Percent of client transactions attributable to the top ten clearing members (if CCP has 10+ clearing meml	bers); Average		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	See Explanatory Note from 14.1
19.1.4.1	Percent of client transactions attributable to the top five clearing members (if CCP has 25+ clearing mem	bers); Peak		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	See Explanatory Note from 14.1
19.1.4.2	Percent of client transactions attributable to the top ten clearing members (if CCP has 25+ clearing meml	bers); Average		Percentage	N/A	N/A	N/A	See Explanatory Note from 14.1
Disc	closure 20.1 - FMI Links, Value of Trades							
20.1.1	Value of trades cleared through each link – as a share of total trade values/total notional values cleared i	n that service	Quarterly	USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	N/A	NSCC does not maintain any interoperable links as described by these items. CDS Clearing and Depository Services, Inc. (the Canadian CSD) is a full service member of NSCC, and is subject to margining and the other requirements of membership as a member. The CDS relationship is described in NSCC's Disclosure Framework under Principle 20. The GSD/CME Cross-Margining Agreement, which is described in GSD's disclosure with respect to PFMI Principle 20, is not an interoperable link as described by sections 20.1 through 20.6 of the quantitative disclosure.
Disc	closure 20.2 - FMI Links, Initial Margin or equivalent financial resources provided							See Explanatory Note from 20.1
Disc	closure 20.3 - FMI Links, Initial Margin or equivalent financial resources collected							See Explanatory Note from 20.1
Disc	closure 20.4 - FMI Links, Results of Back-testing coverage							See Explanatory Note from 20.1

Disclosure	Disclosure Description		Frequency	Data Type	FIC	cc	NSCC	Explanatory Notes		
Reference					GSD	MBSD				
Disc	closure 20.5 - FMI Links, Additional pre-funded financial resources provided to							See Explanatory Note from 20.1		
Disc	closure 20.6 - FMI Links, Additional pre-funded financial resources collected from							See Explanatory Note from 20.1		
Disc	closure 20.7 - FMI Links, Cross Margining									
20.7.1	20.7.1 Value of trades subject to cross margining, by clearing service, as a percentage of total trade values/total notional values cleared			Percentage	0.58%	N/A	N/A	NSCC does not maintain any cross margining arrangements. NSCC does maintain an arrangement with OCC for the settlement of exercised and assigned options, which is described in NSCC's Disclosure Framework under Principle 20. GSD has a cross-margining arrangement with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The disclosure reflects CME eligible positions for the participants receiving CME offset as percentage of total positions cleared. The quarter-over-quarter drop in the disclosure is attributed to the implementation of the Amended and Restated Cross Margining Agreement on January 22nd 2024, where cross-margining positions are segregated from overall positions to be cross-margined.		
20.7.2	Reduction in total initial margin held by the CCP as a result of cross margining, as a percentage of total ini would otherwise have been held.	uction in total initial margin held by the CCP as a result of cross margining, as a percentage of total initial margin that lld otherwise have been held.		Percentage	0.25%	N/A	N/A	Effective January 2024, a new Cross Margin logic was implemented. CME Reductions are now reflected as part of the Total VaR calculation, and no longer appear as a discrete Clearing Fund component.		
Disc	closure 23.1 - Disclosure of rules, key procedures, and market data; Average Daily Volumes									
23.1.1.1	Average Daily Volumes by Asset Class, CCY and OTC/ETD	отс	Quarterly		499,925	13,206	100,802,610	For GSD/MBSD and NSCC, average daily volume data is based on sides (as opposed to trades). For NSCC: Includes Exchange-based and OTC trades. Omnibus Accounts are excluded for NSCC.		
23.1.1.2		NSCC_Exchange			N/A	N/A	111,377,054			
23.1.2.1	Average Notional Value of trades cleared by Asset Class, CCY and OTC/ETD	отс		USD \$MM	7,037,610	369,821	1,509,954			
23.1.2.2		NSCC_Exchange		USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	756,137			
Disc	:losure 23.2 - Disclosure of rules, key procedures, and market data; Non-Yet-Settled									
23.2.1	Gross notional outstanding/total settlement value of novated but not-yet settled securities transactions by Asset Class, CCY and OTC/ETD	CDS_OTC	Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$BN	2,057	374	287	Values located in the FICC and NSCC financial statements, under the Notes to Financial Statements – Guarantees http://www.dtcc.com/legal/financial-statements.		
Disc	closure 23.3 - Disclosure of rules, key procedures, and market data; Execution Facility									
23.3.1	Average daily volumes submitted by Execution facility or matching/confirmation venue		Quarterly		N/A	N/A	See 23.1	See comment from 23.1		
23.3.2	Notional contract values submitted by Execution facility or matching/confirmation venue			USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	See 23.1			
Disc	Disclosure PRC 1 - Payment Risk Committee Disclosure 1 - Concentration Measures									

isclosure	Disclosure Description		Frequency	Data Type	FICC		NSCC	Explanatory Notes
eference					GSD	MBSD		
	Initial Margin Required	Top 3 Members	Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$MM	8,999	3,656	2,577	
	Number of Members with x% of Initial Margin Requirement	> 20%		Count	0	1	0	Aggregated by deposit account.
		15% to 20%		Count	0	0	0	
		10% to 15%		Count	0	1	0	
		5% to 10%		Count	2	4	3	
		< 5%	ļ	Count	181	100	146	
	Total Initial Margin Posted (Market Value)	Total		USD \$MM	51,623	10,749	13,008	
Dis	closure PRC 2 - Payment Risk Committee Disclosure 2 - Initial Margin Detail							
	Initial Margin Breakdown by Component	VaR / Volatility	Quarterly/ Quarter End	USD \$MM	39,620	7,998	7,299	The Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Volatility components are bathe potential price fluctuations of unsettled positions. With the implementation of SVaR for FICC, Margin Proxy used as a backup VaR methodology in the event of a sign vendor data disruption.
		Coverage Component (CC)		USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	8	The Coverage Component is a back-test-like component meant to address potential model deficiencies. The Coverage Component is designed by NSCC to mitigat risks associated with a Member's Required Deposit being insufficient to cover projected liquidation losses to the Coverage Target by adjusting a Member's Required Deposit towards the Coverage Target.
		Margin Liquidity Deposit (MLA)		USD \$MM	1,251	364	573	The Margin Liquidity Adjustment Charge (MLA), addresserisk presented to the Clearing Corp when a Member's pocontains large Net Unsettled Positions in the particular grecurities with a similar risk profile or in a particular asse
		Blackout Period Exposure Adjustment		USD \$MM	7	N/A	N/A	Blackout Period Exposure: Refers to the exposure to GSD Reverse Repo participants of the potential overvaluation MBS Collateral in GCF Repos during the Blackout Period. adjustment to Clearing Fund Requirements (increase to R participants and decrease to Reverse Repo participants) i made based on MBS positions in Member's GCF portfolio during the Blackout Period. The adjustment is based on the average realized pay-down rate transactions. The adjustment during the Blackout Period, the first 5 to 7 business each month.

Disclosure	Disclosure Description		Frequency	Data Type	FIC	с	NSCC	Explanatory Notes
Reference					GSD*	MBSD		
	Diff	argin Req. ifferential (MRD)		USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	2,456	The NSCC MRD is designed to address position-variability risk by estimating the shortfall of end-of-day VaR and mark-to-market compared with the next day's intraday risk and the risk that the next margin call will not be satisfied.
		Mark-to- irket (MtM)		USD \$MM	N/A	N/A	440	As a cash market CCP, NSCC uses a continuous net system where securities within the settlement system are marked daily to the prior night's closing price. Net portfolio debits per Member are collected as part of the Member's Required Deposit; net portfolio credits are not included. Value also includes 'When Issues MtM'. In FICC, GSD and MBSD maintain a pass-through MtM process whereby it collects MTM debits from those Members with debits and passes those to the Members with MTM credits.
	Spec	ecial Charge		USD \$MM	1,098	400	180	GSD includes: Back Test Charges, Intraday Supp. Fund Deposit, Minimum Deposit, and Special Charges MBSD includes: Back Test Charges, Intraday MTM Charges, Intraday VaR Charges, Adequate Assurance, and Special Charges NSCC includes: Back Test Charges, Adequate Assurance, Intraday Mark-to-Market Charge, and Intraday VaR Charge.
	Othe	ner Charges		USD \$MM	0	4	891	GSD includes: Minimum Requirement Adjustments, Excess Capital Premium, and Falling Below Minimum Requirement MBSD includes: 6 Day Fails Interest, Excess Capital Premium, Falling Below Minimum Requirement, and Minimum Requirement Adjustments NSCC includes: Family Issued Securities, CNS Fails, Non-CNS Requirements, CF Premium, and Minimum Requirement Adjustments
		Portfolio ifferential		USD \$MM	980	N/A	N/A	Portfolio Differential Charge is designed to mitigate the risks presented to GSD by period-over-period fluctuations in a Member's Margin Portfolio(s) that may occur between the collections of Member's GSD Required Fund Deposits

^{*}Effective January 22nd 2024, the Amended and Restated Cross Margining Agreement was implemented at GSD. CME Reductions are now reflected as part of the total VaR calculation, and no longer appear as a discrete Clearing Fund component at GSD.